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In this article it is not proposed to retrace the familiar well-trod-
en grounds with respect to bilateral air transport agreements. There
exists, after all, a fairly impressive, if not abundant, literature on
the subject, albeit focused mostly on route exchange, capacity, traf-
fic rights and tariffs.' On the other hand, the present widely felt dis-
satisfaction with the existing situation in international air transport'
and the resulting re-examination of its economic and legal structure
* J.D., Charles University of Prague; post-doctoral studies in Air Law, Inter-
national Law, Air Transport. Former Member of the ICAO Council and Chair-
man of the ICAO Finance Committee and Legal Subcommittee on the revision
of the Warsaw Convention. Former Consultant for Air Canada. Dr. Gertler re-
sides in Ottawa and works as an advisor to the Canadian Transport Commission,
International Transport Policy Committee (International Air Transport Branch).
The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and do
not have any official standing.
' See, e.g., B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 231-46
(1962) [hereinafter cited as CHENG]; 0. LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANS-
PORT AND NATIONAL POLICY 378-82 (1942); Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement
Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and Future of Bilateral Air Transport
Agreements, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 419 (1975); Lissitzyn, Bilateral Agreements on
Air Transport, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 248 (1964); Lowenfeld, CAB v. KLM:
Bermuda at Bay, 1 AIR LAW 2-18 (1975).
J IATA Director General K. Hammarskj6ld has called for "imagination and
foresight in seeking co-operative solutions to the challenge of today's problems"
and for a critical review of traditional concepts (foreword to his report to the
10th Annual General Meeting of the International Air Transport Association,
IATA Review, October 1975, at 6); IATA General Counsel J.G. Thomka-Gazdik
has expressed doubts about the "regulatory assumptions and practice of the Chi-
cago System" (speech before the International Bar Association Conference, IATA
Review, October 1975, at 3); Lowenfeld has observed that the existing regime,
"the first major attempt to control an international industry," is in "deep trouble"
and in need of some "imaginative leadership" (Lowenfeld, A New Takeoff for
International Air Transport, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 36, 49-50 (1975)).
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cannot but also involve the "vast cobweb"' or "intricate network'"4
of bilateral agreements linking individual pairs of states. This is not
to suggest that an effort be made to resuscitate some earlier at-
tempts of multilateral solutions to air transport problems.' As to
scheduled services, such an effort would apparently be no closer to
reality now than it was in 1944 when, at the Chicago Conference,
the Brazilian delegate thought that "perhaps the time will never be
ripe" for the internationalization of aviation.' Instead an examina-
tion will be made with a view to determining whether bilateral air
transport agreements could be made to contribute more effectively
to the smooth, economic and orderly operation of international air
transport services in a constantly changing environment.
Several years ago, on the "threshold of the jet transport age," it
was speculated that a "complete redrafting of most bilateral air
pacts ... will be required" as a consequence of the introduction of
jet aircraft.' Such a complete over-haul of the existing structure of
routes and traffic rights did not occur. States actively involved in
international air transportation did, however, become entangled in
an almost continuous process of reviewing, revising, interpreting
bilateral air agreements and solving different kinds of problems
which arise not only because of changes in aircraft technology but
also, if not primarily, because of new trends and developments in
air traffic.
As will be described later in more detail, a typical bilateral air
agreement today is far more comprehensive than the standard text
' CHENG, supra note 1, at 26.
' Franck, International Law in Canadian Practice: The State of the Art and
the Art of the State, 31 INT'L J. 197 (1976).
' E.g., the draft resolution presented by Australia and New Zealand at the
International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 1944, calling for the "estab-
lishment of an international air transport authority which would be responsible
for the operation of air services on prescribed international trunk routes and
which would own the aircraft and ancillary equipment employed on these routes
... " proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, at 550 (1948).
Also, note the aborted subsequent attempts to reach a multilateral agreement on
commercial traffic rights at the First Interim (PICAO) Assembly in 1946, at the
1st Session of the ICAO Assembly in May 1947 and at the Geneva meeting of
the Commission on Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in Inter-
national Civil Air Transport (November 1947).
Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, at 544 (1948).
T L.L. Doty as quoted by Stoffel, American Bilateral Air Transport Agree-
ments on the Threshold of the Jet Transport Age, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 134
(1959).
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developed at the Chicago Conference in 1944 or the 1946 Ber-
muda Agreement. Over the years, states have added more provi-
sions to the basic Chicago or Bermuda scheme. The present objec-
tive of the agreements seems to be not only an exchange of routes
and traffic rights, but also the establishment of a broad spectrum of
administrative, legal, economic and operational conditions consid-
ered necessary for the operation of air services and for the related
commercial and other activities of airlines in the territory of the
other party. The evolution of this scope and content of the agree-
ments was a logical process predicated on accumulated knowledge
and experience acquired by states about what should be bilaterally
negotiated and agreed upon. There are practically no considerations
which would restrict the discretionary power of two negotiating
sovereign states with respect to their right to include in their bilat-
eral agreement any provisions deemed desirable. Suffice it to men-
tion in this respect resolution LXXI-6, adopted by the ICAO Coun-
cil on October 1, 1970, directing the ICAO Legal Committee to
study a special clause to be incorporated into bilateral air agree-
ments, providing for the enforcement of international legal obliga-
tions relating to unlawful interference with international civil avia-
tion' or, in a quite different area, the U.S. efforts to put on a bi-
lateral legal basis the operation of international charter flights or
services. There is, indeed, a great variety of provisions which states
include, or may consider including in their bilateral air agreements,
and this is not in contradiction to the fact that there also exists a
considerable degree of uniformity of certain principles and of the
language used in many of the basic provisions."0 The question is now
whether the manifest flexibility of bilateral air agreements can be
stretched even further in order to make this instrument fully re-
'ICAO Doe. 8936-LC/164-2 at 180 (1971). See also FitzGerald, Recent
Proposals for Concerted Action Against States in Respect of Unlawful Inter-
ference with International Civil Aviation, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 161 (1974).
'Here, of course, preference is given to special bilateral agreements of under-
standings on charters, apart from those on scheduled services. See Lichtman,
Regularization of the Legal Status of International Air Charter Services, 38 J.
AIR L. & COM. 441 (1972).
10 This fact seems to have been one of the considerations which led O'Connell
to the deduction that we may be witnessing first steps towards developing "posi-
tive international administrative law in the aviation field." D. O'CONNELL, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA, at 148 (1966) [hereinafter cited as O'CON-
NELL].
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sponsive to possible new requirements in the last two decades of the
century, and whether or not the "cobweb" of bilateral contractual
links, possibly coupled with a similar international structure gov-
erning charters, will not outgrow the administrative and regulatory
faculties of governments and/or the established pattern and prac-
tices of airlines' operations.
The successful or even the aborted attempts to add more provi-
sions to the typical Chicago or Bermuda content of bilateral air
agreements would seem to underline the values of bilateralism and
the relevance of bilateral air agreements in present international air
transport. And yet, a number of questions could be asked regarding
the actual status of bilateral air agreements, both in the legal sense
and as an instrument of economic control and regulation, the
weight and authority enjoyed by these agreements or the concern,
or lack of it, over their faithful observation. The orderly implemen-
tation of an entire agreement, that is, leaving no gaps and putting
all parts of the agreement in operation to the benefit of all parties
and users concerned, is not always and in fact is very rarely without
complications. Characteristic is the uncertainty about the practical
application of available methods for the enforcement of obligations
under bilateral air agreements. In Kittrie's article on the United
States' regulation of foreign airlines competition,11 the writer con-
siders it a "political question" whether the tools to be employed for
the resolution of conflicts concerning aviation should be "judicial
tribunals, arbitration, diplomatic negotiations or administrative
controls." In his book on aviation law Lowenfeld raises, in the con-
text of the 1972 Aerolineas Argentinas case, the following ques-
tions: "Should Aerolineas ... (i) seek a hearing before the Board;
(ii) seek injunction or stay from a United States district court; (iii)
seek review of the (CAB) order in a circuit court; (iv) serve
notice of a demand for arbitration?"'" These considerations are spe-
cifically applicable to the situation in the United States but that does
not mean that bilateral air agreements between other countries are
immune from similar uncertainties or ambiguities affecting their
role and relevance for international air transport relations.
As noted previously, bilateral air transport agreements, based
i' Kittrie, United States Regulation of Foreign Airlines Competition, 29 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1, at 2 (1963).
"A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW, 11-104 (1972).
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historically on the standard text developed at the Chicago Confer-
ence in 1944 and the Bermuda Agreement between the United
States and United Kingdom of 1946, with some subsequent influ-
ence of another standard text developed by the European Civil Avi-
ation Conference,'" display a remarkable similarity in many ap-
proaches or principles and in the language used in individual pro-
visions. This tendency towards uniformity could not but have been
helped by ICAO developing and publishing its two handbooks,
dealing with administrative and capacity clauses in bilateral air
transport agreements."
It might not be appropriate to speculate in this article about all
the causes of these tendencies toward some degree of uniformity.
Also there might be some risk of either under or overestimating the
importance of such causes. It is, however, interesting to note that
following ICAO Assembly resolution A21-27" the Paris-based In-
stitut du Transport Arrien (ITA), acting as consultant for ICAO,
prepared a study on "tariff clauses in bilateral agreements", con-
cluding with a number of good reasons why, under present circum-
stances, the best solution might be the elaboration of a few
standardized options (italics added), any one of which could be
selected by the two countries negotiating an agreement as the most
suitable clause on tariffs. One might also recall O'Connell's remarks
on the standardization of the administrative and technical clauses
being only "one fairly short and possibly formal step away from
positive international administrative law in the aviation field".'"
Despite this, and while being in full sympathy with the objective
of further expansion of the body of positive international adminis-
trative aviation law as incorporated primarily in the 1944 Con-
" For the text of the "Standard form of agreement for provisional air routes"
adopted at the Chicago Conference, see Proceedings of the International Civil
Aviation Conference, at 127-29 (1948). The U.S.-U.K. Bermuda Agreement is
reproduced in CHENG, supra note 1, Appendix D.
14 Handbook on Administrative Clauses in Bilateral Air Transport Agreements,
ICAO Circular 63-AT/6 (1962). Handbook on Capacity Clauses in Bilateral Air
Transport Agreements, ICAO Circular 72-AT/9 (1965).
11ICAO Doc. 9118, at 81 (1975). Resolution A21-27 directed the ICAO
Council to instruct the Secretary General to "undertake a study of existing bi-
lateral tariff clauses with a view to exploring the feasibility and relative benefits
of either an international ICAO standard tariff clause or an international agree-
ment embodying such a clause."
" O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 148.
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vention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)1"
and its Annexes, one cannot but have some doubts as to whether
the entire heterogeneous set of rules constituting the typical con-
tent of a bilateral air transport agreement will or can follow the
same desirable path to increasing uniformity and possible codifica-
tion. States may prove hesitant to endorse on a broader, interna-
tional basis some of the obligations they now readily accept in a
repetitive and standardized fashion, in their bilateral relations with
selected partners.
Against the background set out above it is now intended to take
a closer look at some of the problems relating to the present status
and functioning of bilateral air transport agreements.
I. THE CONTENT OF BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS:
WHAT Is REALLY ESSENTIAL?
The scope of the standard bilateral air transport agreement de-
veloped at the Chicago Conference18 was relatively narrow. It
dealt basically with only six spheres of air relations:
1. designation of airlines for the operation of agreed services
and their qualification;
2. procedure for granting the operating authorization;
3. applicability of national laws and regulations relating to the
operation of aircraft and to the admission to or departure
from national territory of passengers and other traffic;
4. recognition of aeronautical certificates and licenses;
5. non-discrimination in the imposition of airport and other
charges;
6. customs exemptions for fuel, oils, spare parts, etc. destined
for use by aircraft operated on agreed services.
Also, it was understood that there would be an annex which
would include a "description of the routes and of the rights granted
whether of transit only, of non-traffic stop or of commercial entry
... .and the conditions incidental to the granting of the rights.
Where rights of non-traffic stop or commercial rights are granted,
the Annex will include a designation of the ports of call ....""
Thus, the Chicago model introduced a distinction between provi-
'
7 ICAO Doe. 7300/5 (1975).
"ICAO Doc. 2187 at 20, 21 (1960).
19 Id. at 20.
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sions of an administrative nature constituting the main body of
the agreement and provisions relating to the commercial transac-
tion itself, that is, to the exchange of routes and traffic rights, which
were to be included in the annex.
As pointed out earlier, in the more than thirty year period fol-
lowing the Chicago Conference, states have, in their bilateral air
agreements, developed and modified the standard Chicago text.
New provisions have been added. Emphasis of other provisions has
shifted or the phraseology has been refined. It has been a process
not dissimilar to that described by Metzger in the context of United
States bilateral commercial treaties: "[I]t was the desire on the part
of the United States and foreign countries to increase the volume
of mutually beneficial trade and investment which caused the treaty
covered to be expanded to include personal rights-so called estab-
lished provisions, along with the more strictly trade, investment,
and navigation provisions.""
Two main objectives have been evident in the practice of states:
one seeking refinement and greater accuracy of the language used
in the air agreements, particularly for those parts of the agreements
relating to the exchange of routes and traffic rights; the other
striving to make the rules for the operation of air services as com-
prehensive as possible, even at the price of the reiteration of some
provisions already in force by virtue of other instruments (e.g., the
Chicago Convention or bilateral agreements on avoidance of
double taxation) and often expanding beyond the purely aero-
nautical orbit to such items as provisions on customs, taxation,
transfer of funds and employment of personnel by airlines. 1
There may be several ways for classifying the typical content of
present bilateral air transport agreements. ICAO made a distinction
between the "administrative" and "capacity" clauses.' Cheng re-
2 S. METZGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, TRADE AND FINANCE 147 (1962).
1 The Chicago Convention itself contains a number of provisions which may
be called "non-aeronautical." See Article 13-Entry and clearance regulations,
Article 14-Prevention of spread of disease, Article 22-Facilitation of formal-
ities, Article 23-Custom and immigration procedures, Article 24--Customs duty,
Article 27-Exemption from seizure on patent claims.2
"Handbook on Administrative Clauses in Bilateral Air Transport Agree-
ments, ICAO Circular 63-AT/6 (1962) [hereinafter Handbook], specifies the fol-
lowing main typical provisions of the agreements (in addition to the clauses on
capacity): granting of rights, conditions imposed on the exercise of rights granted,
revocation and limitation of rights, airport and facility charges, customs duty and
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ferred on the one hand to provisions granting the "transit" and
"traffic" rights, and on the other hand to those dealing with "ancil-
lary" rights." O'Connell in his analysis of Australian bilateral air
agreements deals separately with the "technical and administrative
clauses" and the "provisions for determining limits of capacity and
for fixing routes.""4 For the purposes of this article it may be a
worthwhile exercise not only to categorize the provisions but also
to try to assess simultaneously which provisions are essential and
which are only desirable for the creation of an adequate treaty for
the operation of air services.
One group of provisions of bilateral air transport agreements
relates to the operation of flights on scheduled services. Most of
these provisions could be called "technical" and, as between ICAO
States, they are clearly connected with the Chicago Convention.
Their common denominator is that they do not exclusively apply
to international commercial transport services but to international
flights as such.
One typical provision of this kind is that concerning the applic-
ability of air regulations. The inclusion of such a provision usually
accomplishes nothing more than a reconfirmation in a bilateral
context of the applicability of Article 11 of the Chicago Con-
vention. ' It is therefore no coincidence that this provision has not
been included in the ECAC Standard Clauses for Bilateral Agree-
other charges, recognition of certificates and licenses, applicability of air regula-
tions, entry and clearance regulations, tariff provision, registration of agreement,
settlement of disputes, modification of agreement, entry into force and termination
of agreement. Among the "other provisions" the Manual lists facilitation of cur-
rency exchange and consultation between aeronautical authorities.
2 Provisions on "ancillary" rights should include: non-discriminatory appli-
cation of national air regulations, use of airports and other facilities, airport and
similar charges, customs duties and transient aircraft, supplies introduced into
or taken on board in the territory of the other contracting state, certificates of
airworthiness and personnel licenses, facilitation, distress, emergency landing or
other accidents, export of surplus earnings, commercial operations. CHENG, supra
note 3, at 289-356.
24O'CONNELL, supra note 10, at 148-56.
1 Article 11 of the Convention reads as follows: "Subject to the provisions of
the Convention, the laws and regulations of a contracting State relating to the
admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international
air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within
its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of all Contracting States without dis-
tinction as to nationality, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon en-
tering or departing from or while within the territory of that State." (ICAO Doc.
7300/5 at 5, 1975).
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ments. If a bilateral agreement only repeats Article 11 of the
Chicago Convention, such inclusion probably would be justified
on the grounds that, in the judgment of contracting parties, it
helped to make the agreement complete or assisted in its interpre-
tation and implementation, or the contracting parties wished to
keep certain rules in force even if the Chicago Convention should,
for whatever reasons, cease to apply. There also may be exceptions
when some variation in the text might justify the inclusion of such
provision in a bilateral agreement."
Another usual "technical" article provides for mutual bilateral
recognition of certificates of airworthiness of aircraft and certifi-
cates of competency and licenses for personnel. This is similar to
Article 33 and Article 32(b) of the Chicago Convention. Again,
there might be doubts about the need to repeat, in a bilateral con-
text, applicable and generally satisfactory provisions of the Chicago
Convention. The ECAC Standard Clauses do not contain a pro-
vision of this kind. On the other hand, there have been some im-
portant expansions of this provision in the treaty practice of some
states. A modified provision recognizes the possibility of differences
between practices of one of the contracting parties and ICAO
standardse and establishes a procedure for cases when one of the
parties does not consider the non-conforming practices of the other
party to be acceptable. 8
Less frequent in modem bilateral air transport agreements are
"technical" provisions dealing, for example, with the investigation
of accidents, nationality of aircraft crew, documents to be carried
26 One such example is the Canada-Fiji agreement. Air transport agreement
Canada-Fiji, [1974] Can. T.S. No. 15, article 7, paragraph 1 reads, in part, as
follows:
the laws and regulations of one Contracting Party relating to the
admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged
in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation
of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the
aircraft of the designated airlines of the other Contracting Party
no less favourably than to aircraft of airlines of the first Contract-
ing Party or to aircraft of other parties to the Convention . ..
217 Under Article 38 of the Chicago Convention, ICAO States have the right,
under certain circumstances enumerated therein, to notify ICAO of the differences
between their own practices and international (ICAO) standards.
28 E.g., Air Transport Agreement, as amended Jan. 17, 1966, United States-
Canada.
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on board aircraft, and provision of navigational and other technical
services."
Other provisions related to the operation of flights on scheduled
services are administrative in nature. They address charges for the
use of airports, navigational and other facilities, procedure for the
designation of airports and airways available for the operation of
services, non-discrimination in the use of airports, airways, air
traffic services and associated facilities, reciprocal exemption from
customs duty for aircraft, fuel, spare parts, etc.
The second identifiable group of provisions of the bilateral air
transport agreements is that setting forth rules and conditions for
the operation of commercial air transport services. These are the
"rules of the economic game" and usually include articles relating
to the grant of operating rights, designation of airlines and operat-
ing authorizations, qualification of airlines and conditions imposed
on the exercise of operating rights, capacity offered on the agreed
services, tariffs, provision of statistics, facilitation of the transfer
of funds accrued by airlines and currency exchange, airlines' ex-
emption from taxation, establishment of airlines' agencies, sale of
transportation, etc. A bilateral air transport agreement can also
specify the role to be played by the designated airlines in the
determination of capacity or, for that matter, other areas. Specific
provisions governing the operation of extra-flights (extra sections),
filing schedules, special provisions on the change of gauge in the
territory of the other Party, etc., are less frequent.
Provisions of a legal nature, which establish a treaty framework
for the bilateral arrangement of air transport relations between the
two countries involved, can be considered as a third group. The
article containing definitions, provision for the registration of the
29 The reason for a less frequent occurrence of such provisions is, of course,
the wide acceptance of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes. If there is no
specific reason for dealing bilaterally with a technical subject for which multi-
lateral rules have been established by the Chicago Convention and its Annexes,
the incorporation of a provision of this kind in a bilateral agreement brings about
a risk that the language may not be entirely identical and a difference might then
arise between a bilateral provision and a rule of the Chicago Convention or its
Annexes with resulting possible confusion and difficulties in implementation of
such a rule. This does not mean that, depending on circumstances, a repetitive
or duplicative inclusion of the same material in a bilateral agreement could not
serve a useful purpose such as facilitating the interpretation and application of
the agreement or ensuring the continuity of certain legal basis in the event that
the Chicago Convention would cease to apply.
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agreement, procedure for modification, entry into force, termina-
tion and super-session of the agreement, including a quite frequent
provision about the consequences of the possible entering into
force in respect of both contracting parties of a general multi-
lateral air convention covering the same ground as the bilateral
agreement, belongs in this category. Also, in the majority of bi-
lateral air transport agreements there is a provision establishing
a procedure for the settlement of disputes and an article or articles
concerning consultations between respective aeronautical authori-
ties on matters of the interpretation and application of the agree-
ment.
Finally, the remaining and in some respects most important part
of a bilateral air transport agreement constitutes the exchange of
routes to be operated by the designated airline or airlines of the
other party' and of traffic rights to be enjoyed by such an airline
or airlines, with whatever qualifications or conditions the contract-
ing parties might wish to attach to the exercise of such rights. This
part of the agreement resembles a simple commercial transaction,
a deal comparable to a trade agreement fixing quotas on the volume
of exports or imports or other conditions, or to any other contract
between two governments concerning an exchange or provision of
economic benefits.
In the light of the historical background and the typical content
of modern bilateral air agreements as represented by the four cate-
gories or groups of provisions outlined above, it may be easier to
attempt to determine which provisions are indispensable or essential
for the operation of the network of international air transport serv-
ices and which are peripheral or only occasionally useful. It has
been demonstrated that bilateral administrative provisions of a
technical type add very little, if anything at all, to the Chicago
Convention and its Annexes. Thus, bilateral concern could possibly
be confined to those situations where one of the partners in bi-
lateral relations would have filed differences to ICAO standards
not acceptable to the other party. Another possible area requiring
bilateral settlement would be those matters not presently or ade-
30 Cheng calls the exchange of routes the "core of the bargain between the
contracting parties." The points on the specified routes, named or otherwise re-
ferred to in the exchange, are the "counters of the game." CHENG, supra note 1,
at 387.
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quately covered by the ICAO technical law-making, such as air-
craft noise and sonic boom, security, etc.
It also has been demonstrated that an agreement involving an
exchange of routes and traffic rights can be, to some extent, separ-
able from the remainder thereof. Indeed, it is not infrequent in
the practice of states that the operation of international scheduled
services is based not on a formal agreement between governments,
but on a unilateral authorization which could, of course, also in-
clude conditions concerning the permissible volume of capacity,
tariffs or other necessary matters.
There is another group of administrative provisions which regu-
late commercial and economic aspects of the operation of services,
including, but not limited to, such matters as the procedure for the
establishment of tariffs, provision of statistics, transfer of funds
accrued by airlines, and taxation. It might be argued that partic-
ularly in recent years forms of international charters have been de-
veloped which are very close to scheduled services, " and yet for
their operation a set of administrative rules similar to a bilateral
air agreement on scheduled services was not essential since formal
bilateral agreements on charters are still quite rare. There exist,
of course, several bilateral and even multilateral (U.S., Canada,
ECAC countries) understandings on charters which regulate certain
areas of relations pertaining to charters, such as the charter-
worthiness of flights, the filing of charter programs and tariffs, and
the enforcement of charter rules. Apart from this, however, the
administrative matters which, in the field of scheduled services,
form a large part of the content of bilateral agreements between
governments remain subject to national laws (mostly of the country
of destination), or the matter remains unsettled, or it is tacitly
assumed that the pertinent administrative provisions of the sched-
uled services agreement between the same governments are to be
applied to non-scheduled services as well. In any event the ques-
tion can be asked, why a comprehensive set of bilaterally agreed
rules is necessary for scheduled services and unnecessary for the
operation of programmed, schedulized international charters.
Be that as it may, it is noteworthy that typical provisions of
"' For the distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled services, see ICAO
Doc. 7255. For views questioning the traditional distinction, see J.G. Thomka-
Gazdik, Viewpoint, IATA REVIEW, Oct. 1975, at 10.
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bilateral air transport agreements differ considerably when evalu-
ated or compared with respect to their indispensability or relevance,
their relation to the Chicago Convention, or their relation to some
other agreements and to national laws. This might lead to some
doubts, not about the practical usefulness of these agreements,
which is, after all, tested in practice, and the impressive number
of bilateral air agreements gives an unequivocal answer, but about
the merits and values, in the legal sense and otherwise, of the pres-
ent usual content and form of this particular instrument in the con-
text of the organization of international air transport relations.
Continuing with this line of thought one should not find shocking
Stoffel's observation about possibly "putting air transport relations
under the treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation," an
idea which, in his opinion, "deserves more study."' Considering,
however, this matter not in the abstract, but in the awareness of
the more than one thousand bilateral air transport agreements
presently existing, one can easily conclude that these agreements
represent a practical and convenient conglomerate of rules already
existing or customary rules already recognized by states as well as
certain rules newly made by the agreement (although susceptible
to being established by other instruments or by other means) with
the important addition of an agreement involving certain specific
traffic rights and economic benefits. The observations made by
Metzger regarding commercial agreements between states, an ob-
vious "cousin" of bilateral agreements on air transport, come imme-
diately to mind:
The commercial treaty is primarily a contract between nations, but
it also has some attributes of a constitution. It sets forth standards
of conduct .... [Tihe commercial treaty as a whole represents an
effort to establish and maintain an economic climate hospitable to
increasing international trade and investment. ... '
The writer admits that "on some subjects the language (of agree-
ments) will be general, not really representing either a contractual
commitment in the narrow sense or the establishment of a clear-cut
constitutional principle .. ."
32 Stoffel, supra note 7, at 136.
3" S. METZGER, supra note 20, at 148.
34 Id.
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The bilateral air transport agreements seem to be saddled equal-
ly, if not to a greater extent, with similar problems. As will be
expanded upon later, in some cases they seem to represent no more
than an "effort" to create the bare essentials, and not always the
best conditions, for the operation of air services. In addition,
there are certain specific factors that apparently contribute even
further to difficulties in the application or interpretation of the
agreements.
II. DOOMED TO IMPERFECTION?
There are, basically, two possible approaches to the study of
certain problems relating to the application and interpretation of
bilateral air transport agreements. Either approach can possibly
lead to ascertaining whether certain wrongs or deficiencies are
curable, how serious they are and how able the "patient" is to
take on possible additional burdens. One would consist of analytical
studies of typical articles, tailored to easily identifiable problems,
the other would be an effort to discover common denominators of
such problems. I will pursue the second path and discuss briefly
such matters as: (A) the concept of "aeronautical authorities"
under bilateral air agreements; (B) the position of airlines in the
framework of bilateral air agreements; (C) the language used in
bilateral air agreements; (D) the relation between bilateral air
transport agreements and national laws and regulations of States.
(A) Aeronautical Authorities: A Case For Their Better Utilization
Guided by the spirit and predicated on the letter of Article 6
of the Chicago Convention, bilateral air transport agreements
represent an instrument of regulation and control over the opera-
tion of air transport services by the two concerned governments.
This governmental concern over the respective airlines primarily
but not exclusively includes the territories of the two contracting
parties. The bilateral air agreement may simultaneously constitute,
to a greater or lesser extent, an instrument of promotion and stimu-
' The bilaterally agreed regulatory regime may be extended to air transporta-
tion to or from points in third countries. Fifth Freedom rights enable an airline
of one of the contracting states to take on in the territory of another contracting
state, or to put down in that territory traffic destined for, or coming from the
territory of a third state. The International Air Transport Agreement defined
5th Freedom in Article I, Section 1: ICAO Doc. 2187, at 71 (1960).
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lation of such services, a vehicle made available by governments
for the facilitation of air operations in the interest of both the users
of air transportation and the airline industry.
The degree of intensity of direct involvement of governments
in the actual shaping of bilateral air transport relations varies and
this is only natural given the possible differences of policies leading
to the conclusion of an agreement. These differences may stem from
constitutional, social and economic background of the two con-
tracting partners. On the one hand this "involvement" could be
restricted to the act of the conclusion of the agreement leaving its
implementation to administrative bureaucratic bodies on the lower
level of governments or to the national airlines. On the other hand,
it can entail a fairly detailed monitoring of all significant events
or developments in the bilateral arrangements on air transport.
The bilateral air agreements constitute and define for the pur-
poses of performing certain functions in the implementation of the
agreements, special government bodies called the "aeronautical
authorities.""8 Although these "aeronautical authorities" in the
meaning of bilateral air transport agreements are government de-
partments or other bodies which have regulatory or other respon-
sibilities in civil aviation under respective national laws, their
international position, i.e. the content on forms of their functions
with respect to bilateral air agreements, may not be completely
identical with their domestic position as shaped by national laws
and regulations applicable to international air transport. Apart
from the fact that the objective of bilateral air agreements requires
specific bilateral understandings only on certain selected matters
where the need for uniform, reciprocal or agreed upon treatment
is clearly manifest, the other matters being left to national regula-
"In international practice the "aeronautical authorities" defined in bilateral
air transport agreements are those authorities which have statutory responsibilities
in air transport economic, commercial, and technical matters. It may be, there-
fore, one single authority or two authorities with delimitation between economic
and technical functions. The United States agreements, for example, define as an
"aeronautical authority" the Federal Aviation Administration with respect to
technical permission, safety standards and requirements. In all other matters the
Civil Aeronautics Board is the "aeronautical authority." In the Canadian bilateral
air transport agreements concluded after 1945 both the "Minister of Transport"
and the Air Transport Board (later the Canadian Transport Commission) have
been defined as the Canadian "aeronautical authorities." The Air Transport
Board, and similarly now the C.T.C., has been exercising these duties in transport
and economic matters.
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tions, the reciprocal nature of the agreements entails a search for
an identical formulation of the functions of the "aeronautical
authorities." Since their domestic legal position may not be the
same, such required identity of functions with respect to the bi-
lateral agreements may lead to some kind of a redefinition of their
role in international air transport, if not in a general fashion, at
least in relation to air services individual air transport agreements.
More frequent functions assigned under bilateral air transport
agreements to the aeronautical authorities can be summarized as
follows:
1. granting of operating authorization(s) including the exami-
nation of the qualification of airlines;
2. functions relating to capacity (monitoring, remedial mea-
sures of the pre-determination of capacity, approval of ca-
pacity agreements between airlines, etc.);
3. provision of statistics or organization of exchanges of sta-
tistical data;
4. functions relating to tariffs (acceptance of filings, exami-
nation and approval, negotiations on tariffs);
5. functions relating to the interpretation, application and
modification of the agreement or to the settlement of dis-
putes, including international contacts and consultations
between the aeronautical authorities on the interpretation,
application or modification of agreements;
6. approval of commercial and other agreements between air-
lines.
Occasionally, the aeronautical authorities are given some addi,
tional, less typical responsibilities concerning, for instance, the
staff stationed by a designated airline in the territory of the other
party and its location, the nationality of aircraft crews, and the
operation of additional scheduled flights (extra sections).
Since the implementation of the agreements is a matter to be
taken care of by respective governments in conformity with their
constitutions and other laws, it would appear to be the responsibility
of each of the two contracting parties to ensure that the body named
as the aeronautical authority in a bilateral air agreement will also
possess all necessary legal powers to discharge the functions arising
from the bilateral agreements. In the alternative, it is clear that a
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certain redefinition of their role in international transport, for rea-
sons referred to above, will have to exist.
There is also the question of the nature of specific functions
originating in a bilateral agreement which is discernible regard-
less of whether these functions are performed within or supple-
mental to national regulations. One such feature is possible greater
flexibility for case-by-case adjustments as opposed to uniformity
and certain rigidity of national rules." Further, these functions have
more positive or promotional aspects than would be typical for a
normal regulatory activity." The distinction between strictly re-
medial and managerial functions does not seem to apply fully."'
Some of the functions cannot be discharged in the national context
only, but necessitate development of international relations be-
tween the aeronautical authorities concerned and their mutual
cooperation.' Another important factor seems to be that in the
domestic field an aeronautical regulatory body can compartment-
alize its functions as desired, while a bilateral air agreement being
a specific, coherent whole, would best be administered by an inter-
grated and internally coordinated system of activities, without
approaching in isolation the individual areas of the agreement.
In the meaning of bilateral air agreements, the aeronautical
authorities are a creation thereof. Under the present conditions in
international air transport there is no doubt about the need to have
specialized government bodies constantly monitoring the imple-
mentation of agreements and taking, in direct mutual co-operation,
steps as necessary toward their adequate operation in practice. It
would be unfortunate if the internal constitutional or administra-
tive system of states should limit the discharge of duties entrusted
37 Cf. observations made by McCarroll, The Bermuda Capacity Clauses in the
Jet Age, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. at 129 (1963).
81 Nerbas, Canadian Transportation Policy, Regulation and Major Problems,
33 J. AIR L. & CoM. at 253 (1967).
11 The managerial discretion of airlines can be seriously affected by measures
taken by the aeronautical authorities exercising functions pursuant to a bilateral
air transport agreement. Such measures would have some "managerial" aspects
and influence the viability of services, as with respect to the specification of
routes and exercise of traffic rights.
11 Rosevear has observed that "the bilateral system, by its very nature, requires
more frequent and, as a result, more intimate discusion between the states."
Scheduled International Air Transport: A Canadian Analysis, THE FREEDOM OF
THE AIR 125 (E. McWhinney and M. Bradley eds. 1968).
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to the aeronautical authorities by bilateral air agreements. It would
likewise be unfortunate if, for the sake of a complete optical re-
ciprocity, such duties should be specified in a bilateral agreement
in a fashion which would make it difficult to accommodate them
within the domestic legal system of either of the two parties.
(B) The Involvement and Detachment of Airlines
The airlines presently engaged in international air transport
represent a considerably mixed bag. They differ with respect to
their economic strength and their share in international traffic, in
terms of their ownership and control, as to their basic policy or
mission, and, more recently, also in terms of their affiliation: in
addition to the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
there is also the International Air Carrier Association (IACA),
which is a group of a number of international charter operators.
Bilateral air transport agreements employ the term "designated
airlines" which are, in substance, air carriers duly designated by
one party in an official communication to the other party for the
operation of agreed services. The provisions of the agreement refer
consistently to designated airlines although for the purpose of the
implementation of the agreement the fact of designation is not
sufficient: the carriers must also be authorized by the other party.
To be authorized, they must be subject to a certain scrutiny estab-
lished by the agreement and reflected in national rules and pro-
cedures.
I will not discuss generally the position of individuals, private
or corporate, in regard to international agreements, but rather will
deal with some specific problems arising for the "designated air-
lines" under bilateral air agreements. A bilateral air agreement as
a treaty is governed by the general rule: "The binding force of a
treaty concerns in principle the Contracting States only, and not
their subjects.""' When negotiating an air agreement, the two par-
ties involved exercise their sovereign rights over the air space under
their control, and the grant of transit or traffic rights is accom-
plished, as a rule, on a government-to-government basis. The
language of the agreements might sometimes be confusing, but
irrespective of possible inaccuracies of language it is between
11 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 829 (7th ed. 1948).
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governments that certain rights are granted or obtained and cer-
tain administrative or other rules established. By the act of desig-
nation and authorization the selected airlines may utilize the pro-
visions reserved for them in the treaty, taking over both rights and
obligations established for such airlines. Both in theory and in
practice agreements are sometimes concluded and enter into force
without an immediate implementation or with only unilateral im-
plementation. It can be deduced that airlines accept the regime
established by a bilateral air agreement. This results because either
the airline has expressed an interest in being designated or because
they are the normal national instrument for the operation of inter-
national air services. A judgment on whether or not such a regime
is satisfactory from the viewpoint of national interests would not be
an exclusive prerogative of the airline industry: any other party
concerned can express an opinion on the policy adopted for the
negotiation, the skill of negotiators, or any other facet thereof.
There are, however, several factors which tend to complicate
this possibly over-simplified picture. The extent and nature of air-
lines' participation in the preparation of new or revised air agree-
ments or in the actual negotiations can cause difficulties. With re-
spect to the United States' situation, one commentator has stated
that the "U.S. carriers are not parties to the negotiations, and in-
deed, often have disagreements among themselves."' The industry
is, of course, as a rule consulted and the representatives of its asso-
ciation may have observer status at negotiations. In the practice
of other countries the situation as to consultations with the industry
is similar with the notable difference that representatives of a na-
tional airline are usually full-fledged members of the delegation. '
Remembering that a bilateral agreement is a set of mutually agreed
rules and a regulatory tool governing the commercial aspects of
the operation of air services, the agreement, and particularly the
commercial exchange of routes and traffic rights, would seem to
be very close to a joint international transaction in which both the
governments and selected airline(s) participate on each side. Thus,
4A. LOWENFELD, supra note 12, at 11-100, note f.
43H. WASSENBERGH, POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY AND
THE LAW OF THE AIR 65 (1957): " . . . in practice it is often the national air-
lines which, as directly interested parties, advise their Government on the routes
and commercial rights to be granted to foreign airlines. It is very exceptional for
such advice not to be followed by Governments."
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the acceptance by airlines of the rights and obligations created
under the agreement would appear in a slightly different light: the
airlines themselves might have participated in the formulation of
such rights and obligations in the process of negotiations. The
plausibility of this view is not disturbed by the fact that the actual
formal selection or designation of an airline or airlines for the
operation of services takes, place after the agreement enters into
force provisionally or definitively." It seems that only in a few
countries does the procedure for the selection in the period between
the entry into force of an agreement and the formal designation to
the other party, have some practical meaning. In countries with
only one international air carrier, or in countries with a prede-
termined division of spheres of influence between two or more
international carriers, the act of selection or licensing and designa-
tion is hardly more than an administrative exercise. Being actively
involved in the negotiations of an agreement, the airlines seem to
be losing the detachment which they would otherwise possess as
corporate citizens or subjects in relation to an international treaty.
The net result would seem to be that the airlines' rights and obli-
gations have the same appearance as if created directly by the
agreement.
The airlines' role in the implementation of the bilateral air
agreement has to be considered as a complicating factor. Such a
role can be exercised in a variety of forms depending on circum-
stances, and can assume positive or, on other occasions, negative
features. Considering the latter, there are known cases of attempts
by national airlines to interfere on various grounds with the process
of licensing a foreign carrier duly designated under a bilateral
agreement by the other contracting party. A possibility of negative
pressures of this kind certainly exists in the United States due to
the legislative and judicial structure. Little can be usefully added
to what has been written by others on this subject.' It would appear
"The designation, i.e., naming of selected airline or airlines, can be done in
the Agreement itself or its Annex. For example, in the Civil Air Transport Agree-
ment, Canada-People's Republic of China, the Chinese "designated" airline is
named in Art. 3 [1973] Can. T.S. No. 2.
"See Hackford, The Colonial Airlines Challenge to U.S.-Canadian Trans-
port Agreement, 19 J. AIR L. & COM. 1 (1952) which describes a case of what
the author calls a "private sabotage of public policy." A court action initiated by
Colonial Airlines resulted in delaying substantially the grant of a license to an
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that if there are no doubts about the qualifications of a foreign
applicant and his application remains strictly within the bilaterally
agreed exchange of routes and traffic rights, objections could pos-
sibly lead to delays and thus to irritations in bilateral air relations,
but not to a straight negative decision unless the CAB also became
convinced about the undesirability of the application and would, in
that unlikely event, propose a course of the non-observation and
denunciation of the bilateral agreement.
It would be erroneous, however, to deduce that the United
States' situation is entirely unique in this respect. Although perhaps
less documented or commented upon in literature, difficulties in
other countries can occasionally interfere with the process of licen-
sing a duly designated foreign carrier. The differing attitudes to-
wards the application of the principle of multiple designation of
airlines embodied in the agreement or on the subject of the sub-
stantive ownership and effective control of a foreign airline apply-
ing for authorization under a bilateral agreement can give rise to
such interferences. Information on the position of national airlines
in such cases is mostly lacking, but it probably would be safe to
surmise that competitive interests, if any, could be expressed in
some form or other. Similarly, in the course of the implementation
of a bilateral agreement there might arise a number of other prob-
lems when national airlines can be called upon for views or sug-
gestions and they would do this in a fashion expressing or protect-
ing their interests. Again, this sometimes could appear as a
negative activity with respect to the smooth functioning of the
agreement if its orderly application is taken in abstract and not as
a result of the continuous confrontation and harmonization of
conflicting interests. The principle of reciprocity would in any
case usually represent a correcting factor in the formulation of a
position by a national airline.
There are several areas where the designated airlines are sup-
posed to exercise positive or even essential functions in the
implementation of bilateral agreements. A case in point is the
airline duly designated by the Canadian government in accordance with the terms
of the agreement. According to Hackford, "a private corporation prevented the
United States from carrying out the obligations it had assumed in negotiation
with another sovereign state." This challenge to the "power of the Government
to make Executive Agreements with foreign powers" was terminated by the with-
drawal by Colonial Airlines of this case from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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determination of tariffs. The Chicago standard text of bilateral air
agreements did not contain a specific provision on tariffs and the
post-war bilateral agreements usually adopted the formula of the
1946 Bermuda agreement. This agreement provided that the re-
sponsibility for fixing tariffs is given, in the first place, to the inter-
national organization of airlines (International Air Transport Asso-
ciation) and there is a bilaterally agreed, back-up mechanism on
the governmental level should the airlines' tariff-fixing machinery
fail. A certain amount of control over tariffs is reserved for the
governments even if the airlines succeed in fixing tariffs by agree-
ment among themselves. According to the study prepared for ICAO
in 1975 by the Institut du Transport Afrien (ITA) a reference to
the IATA machinery appears in almost three quarters of the agree-
ments examined for the purpose of the study. The ECAC standard
clause on tariffs, which seems to be typical for the present attitude
of states, provides that it is, in the first place, the obligation of the
designated airlines to try to achieve an agreement on tariffs (if
possible, through IATA) which is then subject to approval, ex-
plicit or otherwise, by the aeronautical authorities. These authori-
ties, in addition to exercising control over tariffs, have the respon-
sibility to determine tariffs between themselves should the airlines'
negotiations fail.
In addition to tariffs, in the bilateral agreements using the ca-
pacity predetermination formula, the designated airlines are quite
frequently given the responsibility to negotiate and determine ca-
pacity offered on agreed services, subject to approval by the aero-
nautical authorities. In some cases, which are probably exceptional,
the formula goes one step further and no approval by the aero-
nautical authorities, that is, no form of governmental control, is
necessary under normal circumstances."
Procedures of this type may encompass not only matters related
to capacity, such as frequency of flights, type of aircraft or schedul-
ing, but also "conditions of carriage, sales representation and
"E.g., the Air Transport Agreement, Canada-Fed. Rep. of Germany, of
March 26, 1973, provides in article 9, paragraph 5 that the "capacity . . . as
well as the frequency of services . . . and the type of aircraft . . . should be
agreed between the designated airlines in accordance with the principles laid down
in paragraphs 1-4 . . . " Only in the absence of an agreement between airlines
would the aeronautical authorities be confronted with the matter.
1976] BILATERAL TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS 801
ground handling" or "all technical and commercial questions per-
taining to the flights . . . and transportation on the agreed
services" and "all questions concerning commercial cooperation,"
in particular "schedules, frequency of flights, types of aircraft, rates,
servicing of aircraft on the ground, and methods of financial ac-
counting."' 8 As already mentioned, the designated airlines may be
given some role in the agreement on the location of agencies and
on staff stationed in the territory of the other contracting party.
Under some bilateral agreements, traffic rights can be exercised or
certain routes operated only during the validity of a commercial
arrangement, usually pooling, between the designated airlines and
approved by the aeronautical authorities.'
Despite the fact that in some cases the two governments may not
be willing to enter into an agreement unless there is first some
understanding between their national airlines, there is still some
reason for concern over such formulas which leave in the hands of
the designated airlines the operation, if not the existence of the
agreement, including the possibility of a complete discontinuation
of services. Not quite unjustified are J. Naveau's observations about
exchanges of letters between airlines which affect, in some cases,
the regime established by a bilateral agreement, and which, in his
opinion, should be deemed "non-existent" for the governments and
belong properly to the area of commercial private law." Such
formulae, if used, cannot but contribute to transforming or deform-
ing the character of bilateral air agreements with all the ensuing
legal entanglements.
(C) Language of Agreements: A Factor of (Mis) Understanding
It would be reasonable to expect that the bilateral air transport
agreements, which are both a legal document and a formalized
commercial transaction, would strive to achieve the greatest pos-
sible accuracy of language used in their individual provisions.
47Air Transport Agreement, Canada-People's Rep. of China [1973] Can.
T.S. No. 21, art. 7, para. 4.
4
1 Air Transport Agreement, Canada-U.S.S.R., [1966] Can. T.S. No. 18, art.
4, para. 4.
9 E.g., Air Transport Agreement, June 17, 1974, Canada-The Netherlands,
Route Schedule, section I, note 2.
0 Naveau, L'volution du droit des transports agriens, 9 EUROPEAN TRANSPORT
LAw 690 (1974).
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There is no doubt that clear and accurate language would be of
considerable assistance to both the correct interpretation of the
agreements in accordance with the intent of the drafters and to
the smooth implementation of these agreements in practice. On the
other hand, ambiguous language lacking clarity and susceptible
to different interpretations can only impair the role of the agree-
ment in the implementation of bilateral air relations between the
two parties concerned.
The question is whether the deficiencies, which are unfortunately
too often evident in the texts of bilateral air agreements, have
deeper reasons and cannot be, under the present circumstances,
moderated or removed.
The possible criticism of the language used in bilateral air agree-
ments can be initially directed to the generality of some provisions.
For instance, in the article on airport charges, the contracting par-
ties undertake to impose or permit to be imposed charges for the
use of public airports and other facilities which would be just and
reasonable. 1 It is a statement of a principle which is susceptible to
being interpreted in many different ways. In this particular case,
the vagueness of the principle is corrected by the subsequent re-
quirement that the charges be not higher than those applicable to
national aircraft (of the country whose airports or facilities are
being used) engaged in "similar international services.""2 The ques-
tion then arises how helpful is the principle of "just and reasonable"
charges in the first place, not to mention the fact that the corrective
supplement is not deprived entirely of a certain element of vague-
ness, namely in the use of the expression "similar" services. Also,
the text does not deal with situations where there exists a serious
disproportion in the level of charges applied by the contracting
parties and thus an attempt can be made to rectify such dispro-
portions by introducing the principle of reciprocity through na-
tional regulations.
A typical text of the article on tariffs requires that tariffs be
established "at reasonable levels," due "regard being paid" to sev-
E.g., art. 7 of the U.S. Standard "Bermuda" Agreement of February 11,
1972.
1 This is the language of article 15 of the Chicago Convention on Civil Avia-
tion, opened for signature, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 (1948).
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eral factors enumerated in the article." Again, the vagueness of this
principle is corrected by subsequent specific procedure for the
establishment of tariffs by an agreement between the designated
airlines of the two parties subject to approval by the aeronautical
authorities. There may be, however, doubts about the need for such
a principle since it cannot be uniformly understood and applied in
airlines' agreements or in the decision-making process of the aero-
nautical authorities.
Under a typical Bermuda clause on capacity," the designated
airlines have "fair and equal opportunity" to operate air services
over the specified routes. Such air services to be provided to the
public should bear "a close relationship to the requirements of the
public" and they should be operated in such a way as not to "affect
unduly" the services of the airlines of the other contracting party.
The primary objective of air services is providing capacity "ade-
quate to the traffic demands" between the country designating the
airline and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic. I
will not analyze in depth the strength and weakness of the Bermuda
capacity clause in light of present conditions of international air
transport.' There is no internal parallel mechanism supplementing
the "deliberately vague" language or "laissez faire" approach em-
bodied in the basic Bermuda principles. Ex post facto review can
be, of course, requested by either of the two contracting parties
should it believe that these standards or principles have not been
E.g., art. 7 para. I of the ECAC Clauses for Bilateral Agreements of March
1959, ICAO Circular 63-AT/6 at 118 (1962).
"
4 E.g., Article XII of the Air Transport Agreement Canada-U.S.A. of Janu-
ary 1966.
'See Lissitzyn, Bilateral Agreements on Air Transport, 30 J. AIR L. & COM.
249 (1964). Stoffel took the view that the "Bermuda principles are deliberately
vague and their application continues to be not wholly satisfactory to any party.
. . . " Their faults lie, in his opinion, not in what they say but rather in what
they do not say. Some solution may lie in the "refinement and further spelling
out" of the Bermuda principles. (Stoffel, supra note 7 at 130). Against the back-
ground of United States' efforts in 1974-1975 to achieve a reduction of capacity
offered on some scheduled transatlantic services, Naveau wrote about the differ-
ences between the Bermuda text and the actual practices of states. From the
philosophy which inspired the Bermuda clauses "remains only the letter, not the
spirit." L'evolution du droit des transports adriens, 9 EUROPEAN TRANSPORT
LAW 685, at 690 (1974). For a recent look at some of the "Bermuda" problems
see Lowenfeld, CAB v. KLM; Bermuda at Bay, 1 AIR LAW 2-18 (1975) and
Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and
Future of Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 419-96
(1975).
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observed by the airline(s) designated by the other party, although
such a right as envisaged by the Bermuda clause has been very
rarely used." In contrast to certain nebulously expressed principles
in the articles on airport charges or tariffs, the vague language of
a capacity clause of the Bermuda type stands practically on its own
without any supplemental or corrective provisions 7 and remains
subject to different interpretations and methods of application.
General formulations of other parts of the bilateral agreements
tend to obscure the manner in which government regulatory func-
tions should operate in practice. Provisions are often found in bi-
lateral air agreements which stipulate that an understanding be-
tween the designated airlines on capacity, schedules, types of air-
craft or possibly other matters are subject to the approval of the
aeronautical authorities of both parties. It is not clear whether the
role of authorization or approval by the aeronautical authorities
of one of the contracting parties is contemplated only in relation
to the airlines of the other party or, if the nature of the provisions
can be so understood, also in relation to its own designated airline
or airlines. Similarly, the typical provision concerning the substan-
tial ownership and effective control of an airline by the state desig-
nating it or by its nationals, would be enforced, as a rule, by the
other contracting party receiving the designation. It can be, how-
ever, argued that the state designating the airline(s) is not entirely
deprived of some responsibilities in this respect and should be
guided, when exercising its right to designate, by the rules and
principles of the agreement.
In addition to the generality or vagueness of some typical formu-
lations in the bilateral agreements, another problem arises from
the fact that the text of agreements results in many instances from
a compromise reached at the negotiating table and may be more of
" Lowenfeld, C.A.B. v. KLM: Bermuda at Bay, I AIR LAW 2, 8 (1975)
noted "the United States never instituted a capacity consultation under Bermuda."
"' Except, of course, for cases when Bermuda language is used, but the bi-
lateral capacity regime includes also an additional and predominant pre-determi-
nation component [e.g., to the effect that the practical application of the Bermuda
principles shall be subject to an agreement between the aeronautical authorities
of the two Parties "before inauguration of the agreed services" and for the subse-
quent changes of capacity." (article VI of the agreement, Canada-Italy, as
amended, Can. T.S. No. 27.)] It is doubtful whether agreements based on the pre-
determination of capacity in whatever form can be called Bermuda type agree-
ments, even if some Bermuda language is still used.
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an "artfully formulated disagreement" 8 than a clear and precise
establishment of rules, rights and obligations of parties. A. F. Low-
enfeld appears to be correct when observing, in the context of the
Bermuda agreement, that the drafters were evidently more anxious
to achieve agreement in the period allotted for the conference than
they were to avoid all potential controversy in the future." This
concern over formulations which, while simulating an agreement,
obscure the real disagreement and postpone possible controversies,"
is not predicated only on such formulae which leave certain deci-
sions to some subsequent negotiations. The problems may be even
deeper than that. For example, the article on the exchange of
statistics may establish an obligation that, upon request of one
contracting party, the designated airline of the other party must
provide specified statistics concerning traffic on the agreed services.
Surely the negotiators must be relieved if such a formulation is
found mutually acceptable. Language of this nature is, however,
almost a fool-proof device for producing all kinds of disagreements
and difficulties in practice. Without the specification of how, when
and what precise data relating to "traffic" must be supplied, etc.,
and in the light of a certain reluctance to provide such sensitive
information, it is most unlikely that such a provision could be
satisfactorily implemented.
Finally, it is also true that certain language is repeatedly used
in bilateral agreements and becomes a precedent adopted again
and again without the necessary reflection regarding its place and
usefulness under given specific circumstances. Bilateral air agree-
ments provide for the issuance of an operating authorization to the
airline designated by the other party upon fullfilment of all pre-
scribed conditions. There are, of course, many instances when states
incorporate such a provision in their agreements although their
practice is different in that no special formal authorizations to
foreign carriers are issued. Similarly, no formal approval to tariffs
filed with the aeronautical authorities might be given in spite of
58 Fawcett, The Legal Character of International Agreements, 30 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 381 (1953).
59 Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 5.
"Stuart Tipton, Senior Vice-President, Pan American Airways, commented,
in a different but related context, on "compromise verbiage which would render
a policy determination useless." (Note, 11 IATA Rev. 5 (1976) on the U.S.
position with respect to present international aviation problems.)
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the explicit text of the agreement providing for such an express
approval. Many agreements contain a specific prohibition of cabo-
tage traffic although it is made quite clear in other parts of the
agreement that operation of services is permitted only on specified
routes serving specific points and these do not include more than
one point in respective national territories and hence no cabotage
traffic can be available in any case. Not infrequently that portion
of the Bermuda capacity clause relating to the fifth freedom traffic
is unnecessarily incorporated into agreements which are, basically,
only third and fourth freedom agreements.
More examples could be given of this apparent inertia and ten-
dency to preserve certain standard formulations regardless of
whether they are actually useful or needed. As aptly stated by
Szablowski, law is "only good so long as it remedies real factual
situations, once they change, the need for new interpretation or
amendments arises."'" The same applies to the choice of wording
to cover individual subjects of bilateral air agreements.
International agreements may indeed be only "skeletal things, to
be clothed with the flesh and blood of state practice."" The skeletal
structure however, should, be as sound and open to objective exami-
nation as possible. Only if the bilateral air agreements are identified
with their Bermuda form, and, to be more exact, with the Bermuda
clause on capacity and its vague principles, can it be argued that
vague skeletal components are adequate for the essentially "self-
regulatory regime which they (the Bermuda principles) comprise"
or that "some things ... are simply understood without the neces-
sity of words or written statements.""
From a broader standpoint, the inadequate expression of "skele-
tal" treaty components is not to be desired. H.D. Metzger, while
rightly observing that generally worded principles are "susceptible
to subjective judgment and therefore to effective nullification,""
found some advantage in the fact that such principles provide at
02 Szablowski, Creation and Implementation of Treaties in Canada, 34 CAN.
BAR REV. 41 (1956).
"2 Franck, supra note 4, at 182.
"Cf. Diamond, supra note 1, at 451, 452. If the last statement is true, there
may not be enough justification for the formulation of any principles in the
Bermuda capacity clause at all.
"S. METZGER, supra note 20, at 148.
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least a basis for "complaint by a company against conduct by an-
other which appears to it to be unjust." Would not it be, however,
preferable to establish the treaty framework in such a fashion that
similar complaints, if any, could be put forward on less controver-
sial grounds and with a better chance of achieving some success?
Quite definitely.
(D) Bilateral Agreements and National Regulations: An Uneasy
Co-existence
As has been said, the constitutional rules of the States concerned
determine the procedures or specific measures necessary to effectu-
ate a bilateral air agreement. The application and implementation
of bilateral air agreements has to be exercised by the two govern-
ments in conformity with their laws and practices." In general, it
would appear that in the present practice of states, bilateral air
transport agreements are only rarely subject to formal ratification
by respective national legislative bodies. The texts of agreements
respect the national specifics as to constitutional requirements for
approval, and usually enter into force upon the notification that
such requirements, whatever their nature may be, have been duly
complied with. The nature of internal measures required for the
entry into force of air agreements has its impact on the contents of
the agreement. The two delegations negotiating an agreement may
not be equally free as to the adoption of rules in the agreement.
Their attitudes towards possible provisional applicability of the
agreement as of the date of signature or toward adoption of flexible
formulas for amendments of the agreement may differ.
No one would seriously question the validity of Bin Cheng's
statement, made in the context of the United Kingdom constitu-
tional structure, to the effect that "whenever no change in the do-
mestic law of the state will be required, there is consequently no
need to delay the acceptance of a treaty by subjecting it to subse-
quent ratification."6 This also is the reason why, again according
to Bin Cheng, the majority of the United Kingdom bilateral air
I H. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AR LAw 21, note (d) (3rd ed. 1966): " ...
ratification by a Government of a Convention or Treaty constitutes an under-
taking to incorporate the provisions thereof in its national law, by whatever
method may be necessary under its national constitutional law."
"CHENO, supra note 1, at 470.
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agreements could have been made binding upon the contracting
parties on signature.
A bilateral agreement is a product of negotiating and is to some
extent a juxtaposition or confrontation not only of specific eco-
nomic interests of the two negotiating parties, but also of their dif-
fering institutional, legal and economic systems and traditions. In
order to avoid the need to make adjustments in domestic laws and
regulations as a consequence of a bilateral treaty, either these do-
mestic laws and regulations have to be general and flexible and/or
the content of the treaty must be general and acceptable to both
parties without affecting their laws and regulations. How much
generality can a bilateral air agreement sustain before it loses its
value as a commercial agreement and a legal instrument of the
regulations of air transport activities? Is it more desirable to put
emphasis on uniformly elaborated and applied national rules or
on the flexibility and country-to-country adjustments characteristic
of a bilateral approach through an air agreement?"7 The answer
might be different depending on the degree an air agreement can be
equated with a commercial deal. Also, the problem is compounded
by the principle of reciprocity and by the fact that bilateral air
agreements of the present type do not touch only upon domestic
air regulations, but quite often intrude into other regulatory areas
as well.
It may be worthwhile to take a closer look at some of the aspects
of the parallel functioning of the bilateral air agreements and
national laws, rules and regulations of states which are parties to
such agreements. National aeronautical and other laws, rules and
regulations are one of the means of implementation of a bilateral
air agreement, but they are also complementary to such an agree-
ment or may be considered as existing and operating independently,
possibly overlapping in the treatment of the same subjects. This
complementary role might attain more relevance because of the
generality and incompleteness of the manner in which certain
issues are being treated in bilateral air agreements for reasons
described above, or because of the nature of the compromise on
certain issues which made the conclusion of a bilateral air agree-
ment possible. A bilateral air agreement may fail to settle the ques-
" Cf. McCarroll, supra note 37, at 129.
1976] BILATERAL TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS 809
tion of the exchange of traffic statistics; the provision of certain
data, however, may be required by national regulations." A bi-
lateral air agreement may be silent on the procedure for the estab-
lishment of tariffs, on filing of schedules, performing extra-flights,
and transfer of funds by airlines; national regulations may have to
supply the applicable regime.
Domestic laws, rules and regulations governing international air
transport develop, within the scope of their separate and independ-
ent operation, a number of points of contact with the implementa-
tion and administration of a bilateral agreement."9 Typical examples
are the licensing of foreign airlines, the procedure for the establish-
ment of tariffs and for the filing of schedules. As to licensing,
under a standard formula of bilateral air agreements, after one
contracting party has designated, usually by a diplomatic note,
an airline or airlines--depending on whether it is a single or mul-
tiple designation agreement-to operate any or all of the routes
specified for such a contracting party by an agreement, it is the
function of the aeronautical authorities of the other contracting
party to initiate procedures for granting to the designated airline
appropriate operating authorization or authorizations."0 The agree-
ment usually stipulates that such authorization(s) are to be granted
"consistent with (respective) laws, regulations and procedures"
and "with a minimum of delay". The conditions and qualifications
which may govern the granting of licenses under respective na-
tional regulations are apparently unaffected by such a bilateral
provision since such domestic powers could most likely still be
exercised without contradicting the bilateral clause. This also
applies to the "public convenience and necessity" criterion in coun-
tries where it is part of regulations."1 A typical clause of bilateral
0H. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 65, at 311.
0Cf. H. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 65, at 310: "... there is power
to impose licensing obligations upon United Kingdom aircraft flying ... on inter-
national services. This power, if it exists, would, it is submitted, apply . . . also
to aircraft of States which are parties to the Chicago Convention . . . and pre-
sumably to aircraft operating in pursuance of the provisions of a bilateral air
transport agreement."
7' Both in the United States and Canada a difference is made, regardless of
terminology, between a commercial license or permit on the one hand, and a
technical authorization on the other.
1E.g., The Aeronautics Act, 1970, R.S., c. 2, s. 16(3) (Can.); and subsec-
tions 7(1) and 7(2) of Canada's Air Carrier Regulations.
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air transport agreements permits the withholding of the commercial
operating authorization (or revoking of such an authorization if
already granted, or imposing conditions thereon) in certain speci-
fied circumstances which have to do with the qualification of
foreign airlines, their ownership and control, compliance by such
airlines with the laws and regulations of the state granting the
authorization, or with the conditions prescribed by the bilateral
agreement.
According to Rosevear, when the carriers concerned are "well
known for their competence in international services, there is
usually a short delay only between the time the agreement takes
effect and the inauguration of air services."'" As to the United
States' situation,
the Civil Aeronautics Board has consistently held to the view that
Section 1102 requiring adherence with the provisions of treaties
and other international agreements, or for that matter the bilateral
agreements themselves, do not limit or supplant Section 402,
which grants the Board the general power to protect the public
interest."'
G. N. Calkins has stated that it begins "to look a little . . . empty
to have a public hearing and the formality of making a finding of
a public interest after you have made an international agreement
which pretty much covers the general basic problem of the cases."
The same writer, however, suggested that "evidence might persuade
the Board to recommend to the President the denial of the permit
and the denunciation of the agreement." Lissitzyn concluded that
the "CAB in the performance of its powers and duties... including
Section 402, is under a statutory duty not to take action which
would result in a breach of any obligation assumed by the United
States."" Similarly, Gilliland, when commenting on a possible re-
sistance to licensing a foreign designed carrier, stated that the CAB
has never denied a license on public interest grounds in such a
72 Scheduled International Air Transport: A Canadian Analysis, in THE FREE-
DOM OF THE AIR 133 (E. McWhinney and M. Bradley eds. 1968).
' Kittrie, supra note 11, at 10.
"4 Calkins, The Role of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the Grant of Operating
Rights in Foreign Air Carriage, 22 J. AIR L. & COM. at 268 (1955).
"' Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air Transportation,
Part II, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. at 32 (1951).
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situation, and it is "very doubtful that it has authority to do so while
a bilateral agreement remains in effect and unamended."' Lowen-
feld has observed, in connection with the 1964 Lufthansa case, that
"once the United States ... has made a route grant, the role of the
CAB in deciding a permit application is not much more than
clerical."
Regardless of these differing views, one aspect is the ultimate
action by respective authorities, the other is the possible complexi-
ties of procedures, expenses, and particularly delays occurring be-
fore such an affirmative action is taken. J. E. Robson, the CAB
Chairman, when stressing the need for changes in the handling of in-
ternational proceedings, suggested in January 1976 that the issuance
of permits to foreign carriers be made "less onerous and more
timely, particularly where there exists a bilateral air transport agree-
ment and the carrier has been properly designated by its govern-
ments."' One of the findings of the CAB Advisory Committee on
Procedural Report set up to review CAB operations with a view to
"increase the efficiency and fairness of Board procedures" was to
the effect that "even the issuance of foreign air carrier permits,
which are largely governed by bilateral agreements, required the
passage of 246 days between filing and Board decision.""
As has been recalled above in the context of the Colonial Air-
lines opposition to granting the operating authority to Trans-
Canada Air Lines,' the licensing procedure, which is supposed to
operate smoothly and without unnecessary delays under bilateral
air agreements, may lead in practice to considerable difficulties
and irritations in bilateral air relations.
If in the area of tariffs the bilateral and domestic machinery for
processing and, in most countries, approving tariffs is set in motion
simultaneously, they would not necessarily be in conflict. This
" Bilateral Agreements, in THE FREEDOM OF THE AIR 148 (E. McWhinney and
M. Bradley eds. 1968).
"A. LOWENFELD, supra note 12, at IV-97.
"Speech by J. E. Robson, International Aviation Club (January 20, 1976),
in Washington (Aviation Daily, Jan. 21, 1976 at 105).
"' It also has been reported that in April 1976 the CAB gave its approval to
a request made in 1962 by Polynesian Airlines for a change of their foreign car-
rier permit in consequence of Western Samoa becoming an independent nation.
Aviation Daily, May 3, 1976, at 1.
"See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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would allow the domestic regulatory exercise to be very well within
the powers established by the respective bilateral agreements. There
may be, however, a danger that in such a case the main emphasis
would be put on procedure under domestic regulations. The result
would be that the bilateral clause on tariffs would be implemented
only to satisfy the domestic requirements and procedures, not the
reverse.
In addition, there might be discrepancies in the formal pro-
cedure to follow or in other detailed aspects such as standards
to be used for the consideration of tariffs, deadlines for the sub-
mission of tariffs and length of time reserved for the notification
of possible dissatisfaction with tariffs filed. Also, national regula-
tions may contain a specific definition of tariffs and yet it may not
always be possible to have exactly the same definition accepted in
all bilateral agreements. Such a situation, should it be permitted
to develop, could cause real difficulties in the exercise of regulatory
powers in this particular area. A stronger case would seem to exist
for the bilateral clause to prevail even at the price of sacrificing
the uniformity and uniform application of national rules.
In the majority of cases, a pragmatic solution to such possible
conflicts may be found without unduly disturbing the bilateral air
relations with the other country involved. Yet this is not always the
case. Certain measures based on national regulations could be
taken in full knowledge that they might be, if not in violation, at
least controversial in relation to the applicable bilateral agreement."
In this situation, the decision is then left to the other contracting
party whether to resort to the bilateral settlement of dispute (arbi-
tration) procedure. There are, of course, cases of actual or alleged
conflicts between the bilateral air agreements and national laws or
regulations, or the manner in which these latter are implemented.
In the disputed case of Concorde landing rights at certain points
81 In the context of the 1974 CAB-KLM controversy over filing of schedules
for prior approval, CAB General Counsel T. Heye was reported to have stated
the following: "There is nothing in the bilateral which precludes issuance of an
order by the U.S. directing the cessation of particular schedules and, in the event
such an order should be issued, it would then be incumbent upon the Dutch to
seek arbitration. Whether such arbitration would be required and whether, if re-
quired, the Board's order would take effect prior to the completion of arbitration
are issues which are not only pre-mature now but ones whose resolution best
await the official position of the U.S. concerning these matters." Aviation Daily,
Dec. 4, 1974, at 180.
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in the United States, the French and British governments main-
tained that "in the event of a conflict between the requirements of
a federal United States statute and a treaty ratified earlier by the
United States, the rules of customary international law and inter-
national jurisprudence require that only the treaty may be ap-
plied."" They also maintained that "the international Environ-
mental Policy Act, which is a domestic law, cannot under inter-
national law supercede or enlarge the relevant international agree-
ments."83 Curiously enough, approximately at the same time, the
United States State Department felt obliged to send an official
protest to the British government concerning restrictions on sched-
uled services unilaterally ordered by the United Kingdom authori-
ties." The British argument seems to have been that their order
restricting capacity was not unilateral, but taken after a previous
abortive attempt to settle the matter through bilateral consultations.
It can perhaps be deduced that a great number of disputes in the
application or interpretation of bilateral air agreements have some
relation to national laws and regulations: the contracting party
invoking the bilateral "settlement of disputes" mechanism would
have some support in such domestic laws and regulations.
If a firm domestic policy is taken which affects the implementa-
tion of bilateral air agreements, the obvious answer is, of course,
the renegotiation and modification of such agreements. In his
testimony before the Aviation Subcommittee of the United States
House Public Works and Transportation Committee on proposed
legislation increasing minimum tariff filing period, CAB Chairman
Robson indicated that the thirty days notice provision of existing
bilateral agreements could be amended "over the time" to comport
with the forty-five day period proposed in the bill, and therefore
he did not anticipate any problems resulting from effects of the
changed tariff notice period of existing United States bilaterals."5
This is, however, a lengthy and cumbersome procedure and it is
not always clear what rules would apply in any given bilateral air
relations in the interim period before the bilateral air agreement
is amended. It is no wonder, therefore, that there might be attempts
81 Av. WK. & Sp. TECH., Feb. 2, 1976, at 37.
83 Id.
84 Aviation Daily, Mar. 9, 1976, at 49.
11 Aviation Daily, Nov. 13, 1975, at 65.
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to look for possible short-cuts, mostly in the form of revision in
practice of certain bilateral rules with the tacit concurrence of
the other party, or in the expectation that this other party would
hesitate to set in motion the bilateral "settlement of disputes"
procedure for a matter of relatively minor significance.
In this context it does not seem inappropriate to also mention
the problem of custom exemptions for certain articles necessary for
the operation of international air services, in which matter not only
bilateral air agreements and national regulations of States, but also
the 1944 Chicago Convention may be involved. Article 24 of the
Convention requires, in a mandatory fashion, that certain articles
enumerated therein, like fuel, oils, spare parts, regular aircraft
equipment, be exempted, under the conditions specified in the
article, from customs duty, inspection fees and similar national
or local duties and charges. Modern bilateral air transport agree-
ments often not only expand the scope of Article 24, but also fre-
quently provide for exemptions only "to the fullest extent possible
under national law"'8 and on the "basis of reciprocity." Strictly
speaking, this can, for certain items under certain circumstances,
mean a lowering of Chicago standards or, from another stand-
point, assertion of the predominant role of national regulation
using the vehicle of bilateral air agreements.
In the final analysis, problems which may arise from the co-
existence of bilateral agreements and national laws and regulations
of contracting states cannot but be mitigated by the fact that both
sets of rules are exposed to the same kind of pressures emanating
from the changing conditions and requirements of international air
transport. As observed, perhaps with a slight exaggeration, with
respect to the United Kingdom's situation, the airlines are "always
ahead of regulations."'
The two states entering into a bilateral air agreement also have
every possibility to obtain advance knowledge as to tle applicable
national legal regime of the other party and of problems which
could be encountered. This can enable them to seek, in the text
of the bilateral agreement, necessary assurances or protection from
"E.g., art. XI, para. (a) of the Air Transport Agreement Canada-U.S.A. of
1966, as amended.
"
7 FLIGHT INT'L, Feb. 21, 1976, at 393.
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such foreseeable difficulties or to prepare grounds for possible re-
ciprocal counter-measures. This advance knowledge might be an-
other factor alleviating possible difficulties in the relation between
bilateral air agreements and national laws and regulations of
States.
III. LET THE LAW PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN
BILATERAL AIR RELATIONS
Bilateral air transport agreements belong to inter-governmental
agreements, less formal than "inter-State" treaties.8 Similarly, as
with other inter-governmental, non "inter-State" treaties, they are
a "deliberate creation of international practice" which "the con-
stitutional texts . ..have merely recognized."" Lissitzyn has ob-
served that "the practice of making executive agreements on air
transportation is a constitutional usage ... which has been recog-
nized, acquiesced in, and in effect approved by Congress."'" The
merit of concluding agreements on air transport in the "non inter-
State" treaty form lies primarily on the simplification of procedures
for their negotiations and entry into force. Stoffel mentions the
advantages of using executive agreements on air transport "rather
than the more cumbersome treaty procedure.""1 In Canada,
Szablowski came to the conclusion that because of the modern
practice of concluding inter-governmental agreements "the crea-
tion of international obligations has been greatly simplified."'"
Gotlieb characterized "the informal and pragmatic approach" as
the dominant feature of Canadian treaty-making and in this context
referred to the use of a "variety of entirely intergovernmental
agreements" which "simplified the often complex procedural re-
"See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 41, at 811 (1948). A. McNAiR, THE
LAW OF TREATIES (1961); Jones, International Agreements Other Than "Inter-
State" Treaties, Modern Developments, BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L., 111-22 (1944).
S9Jones, supra note 88, at 117.
" Lissitzyn, supra note 75, at 32. Calkins noted that "the authority for making
such Executive agreements comes from Congress," Calkins, supra note 74, at 262.
In Lowenfeld's opinion, executive agreements on air transport are entered into
"pursuant to direction of the President, and with a statutory authorization (sec-
tions 802 and 1102) that leaves something to be desired. A. LOWENFELD, supra
note 12, at IV-97.
"Stoffel, supra note 7, at 123.
92Szablowski, supra note 61, at 35.
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quirements for full powers, signature, and ratification of treaties.""3
The general classification of the bilateral air transport agree-
ments as inter-governmental agreements, although indicating an
intent on the part of contracting states to achieve simplification and
a greater flexibility in air transport treaty-making, has no implica-
tions for the constitutional procedure of States, or for the validity
of agreements,"' or for their legal effects. To that extent it is of no
great relevance whether in the United States bilateral air transport
agreements are concluded and designated as "executive agree-
ments" or whether in Canada some writers maintain that "execu-
tive agreements" do not exist under the Canadian constitutional
system." Also, the fact that bilateral air transport agreements are
concluded in a less formal fashion does not detract from their im-
portance." It would be outside the primary area of interest of this
article to dwell more on these problems which are basically ones
of classification or terminology in general international law of
treaties."
9A. E. GOTLIEB, CANADIAN TREATY-MAKING: INFORMAL AGREEMENTS AND
INTERDEPARTMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS, CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATION-
AL LAW AND ORGANIZATION at 229 (1974).
91 There are no doubts in the literature as to the validity of inter-governmental
agreements: OPPENHEIM, supra note 41, at 812 stated: "the international validity
of such agreements is the same as that of ordinary treaties." Justice Read, stated:
" . . . treaties and executive agreements are alike in that both constitute equally
binding obligations upon the nation." Read, International Agreements, 36 CAN.
BAR. REV. 531 (1948).
"McNAIR, CONCLUSION OF TREATIES (1961) at 65, observes that the term
"executive agreements" is itself a misnomer as applied to all international agree-
ments other than treaties. Most of the "executive" agreements could be, in his
opinion, designated "legislative-executive" agreements. The United States' con-
cept of "executive agreements" is wider and not identical with the "inter-govern-
mental" agreements.
"Cf. also Justice Read: "Strictly speaking, it might be suggested that there
is no such thing as an executive agreement. Still, as we meet them every day in
practice, we should be over-academic if we insisted too persistently upon their
non-existence." Supra note 94, at 531. Worthwhile noting is also Castel's ob-
servation: "International obligations are entered into in many instances without
reference to Parliament. The negotiation and conclusion of a treaty or other in-
ternational agreement is an executive act." J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW at
864 (1965).
'7 Cf. Justice Sutherland as quoted in Borchard, Shall the Executive Agree-
ment Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 671 (1943-44).
"1Inter-governmental agreements are to be distinguished from the inter-
departmental agreements. The terms like "administrative agreements," "business
arrangements," "functional accords," "functional contracts," etc. are not uniform-
ly used in international practice and may denote different types of agreements in
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From the legal point of view, one of the objectives of the bi-
lateral air agreements may be construed to be a bilateral exchange
of "permissions" or "authorizations" referred to in Article 6 of the
Chicago Convention to enable the operation of scheduled inter-
national air services over or into the territory of the other contract-
ing party, and also a bilateral understanding on some, if not all
"the terms of such permission or authorization."" If, in the eco-
nomic sense, bilateral air transport agreements represent a combi-
nation of a commercial deal and a set of regulatory measures, they
could be regarded, in legal terms, also as a specific two-tier system
comprising a contract authorizing the operation of certain routes
by the airline(s) of one party at the price of an economically
balanced contract working reciprocally in favour of the airline(s)
of the other party. Moreover, rightly or wrongly, the practical
operation of a bilateral air agreement hinges, in some cases, on the
existence of a private law contract between the airlines of the two
parties (e.g., a revenue pooling agreement which may include the
determination of frequency of services and type of aircraft), which,
if its separation were possible, would be otherwise fully binding and
probably enforceable. As to the non-commercial content of a bi-
lateral air agreement, it could be also explained as a product of a
harmonization of national rules of the two contracting parties °
and again there would be probably little doubt about its legal na-
ture and binding effect.
Irrespective of what weight is given to a bilateral air agreement
as an instrument effecting an exchange of authorizations in con-
formity with Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, or the other
legal considerations mentioned above, it seems to be clear that
several important legal elements are present.
In the judgment of the Master of the Rolls delivered in the hear-
ing of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in the Pan American
accordance with the intent of parties and agreed procedures for the signature and
entry into force of agreements.
go Convention on Civil Aviation, opened for signature, at Chicago, Illinois,
Dec. 7, 1944, art. 6, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1948).
10 Cf. H. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 65 at 23: "International air
law cannot correctly be called Private International Law. But in fact the chief
object which much of it was designated to effect . . . is to put an end to the
'conflicts of laws'."
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World Airways v. Department of Trade case,"' a bilateral air agree-
ment, in this particular case the 1946 Bermuda agreement "relat-
ing to air services between their respective territories, '... does not
form part of British municipal law and is only a useful illustration
as to what the Governments have agreed between themselves.
The Bermuda agreement was declared to have no effect in point
of law on the powers which are available to the Secretary of State.
Lord Justice Scarman, sitting on the Court, delivered a concurring
judgement. In our present context, suffice it to say that he likewise
was of the opinion that the Bermuda agreement is no part of the
law of England. He, however, added a caveat that situations might
arise in which it would be proper for the Courts to take note of an
international convention even if not embodied in laws enacted by
Parliament. It may happen, he argued, that two courses would be
reasonably open to the courts: one would lead to a decision in-
consistent with Her Majesty's international obligations under the
convention while the other would lead to a result consistent with
those obligations. If a legal principle has to be formulated in an
area of the law where Her Majesty has accepted international obli-
gations the British Courts who, of course, take notice of the acts
of Her Majesty done in the exercise of her sovereign powers, will
have regard to the convention as part of the full content or back-
ground of the law. Such a convention, especially a multilateral
one, should then be considered by Courts even though no statute
expressly or impliedly incorporates it into national law.
The characterization of a bilateral air transport agreement as a
"useful illustration as to what the Governments have agreed be-
tween themselves," not forming part of the British municipal law, 3
is hardly surprising in light of what seems to be the prevailing
traditional British, and not only British, thinking on these matters.
It seems, however, that it is more an expression of certain difficul-
ties which a national court may undoubtedly experience when
presented with an issue relating to a bilateral air agreement not
ratified or enacted by the respective legislative body rather than an
attempt to assess, in general terms, the legal merits of such or
other inter-governmental agreements. Lord Justice Scarman's ob-
"I' The Times (London), Jul. 30, 1975, at 6, col. 9.
'1 For complete text see CHENG, supra note 1, Appendix D.
13 Similar pronouncements could be, of course, found elsewhere as well.
1976] BILATERAL TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS 819
servations are certainly helpful, but again are formulated basically
from the perspective of municipal law and practice of courts oper-
ating with the municipal law. The inquiry into the legal nature of
bilateral air transport agreements must be directed elsewhere.
One view certainly could be advanced that in some countries
bilateral air agreements are not ratified and enacted by respective
legislative bodies, and are not then generally recognized by courts
as part of the "law of the land," does not necessarily make such
agreements less "legal" or less "law-making." Such agreements are
governed by international law regardless of whether or not some of
their legal components could be explained in such a fashion that,
taking them in isolation, they could be also susceptible to being
governed by municipal law and by the rules governing the con-
flicts of domestic laws. It is, at the same time, equally true that
the mere fact that certain subjects are dealt with, or that certain
content is included in a treaty (bilateral air transport agreement)
does not make such content legal or create legal relations in all
matters covered by the treaty. After all, according to Fawcett,
international agreements "are presumed not to create legal relations
unless the parties expressly or implicitly so declare.' '. ° Similarly
Parry took the view that "the presumption is against an interna-
tional agreement having any strictly legal content at all.''. One
important test to determine whether or not the creation of legal
relations is intended is the provision, or the lack thereof, in the
agreement "for the settlement of disputes arising from the agree-
ment by compulsory judicial process......
The Chicago standard text of bilateral air agreements did not
contain any recommended provision(s) concerning the settlement
of disputes, but clause 9 was reserved for a provision on arbitra-
tion, the "details of which will be a matter for negotiations between
the parties to each agreement.".... Standard clause 7, under which
the operating certificate or permit to an airline of another state
104 Fawcett, supra note 58, at 400.
' C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw at 49
(1965).
10I Fawcett, supra note 58, at 400. Interestingly enough, C. Parry, when quot-
ing Fawcett on this subject, refers to the "settlement of disputes arising from the
agreements" but omits the following words "by compulsory judicial process."
C. PARRY, supra note 105, at 49.
107 Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, at 129 (1948).
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could be withheld or revoked under certain specified circumstances,
would seem to put more emphasis on the self-enforcing aspect of
the agreements. This is not, however, the case of most of the bi-
lateral air transport agreements concluded in the period imme-
diately following the Chicago Conference. As stated in the ICAO
"Handbook on Administrative Clauses in Bilateral Air Transport
Agreements,'' ° a majority of bilateral agreements provide "as the
step following direct negotiation, reference to ICAO, its Council
or a tribunal established within ICAO for advice or decision, while
other agreements refer to ad hoc tribunals, the International Court
of Justice, or some other person or authority." The ICAO Hand-
book then states that "with few exceptions, all existing agreements
.... provide for arbitration either as an alternative to a decision
by Council or as the principal means of settling disputes." More-
over, "most of the agreements also specify the obligation of con-
tracting parties to comply with arbitral decisions rendered.".1°. As
Buergenthal has observed," ' the proportion of bilateral air agree-
ments vesting adjudicatory functions in the ICAO Council has
been declining, but many agreements still provide for an arbitra-
tion procedure or for submission of a dispute to an ICAO arbitral
tribunal.
Only rarely is there no provision in a bilateral air agreement
concerning the settlement of disputes. A large number of agree-
ments, particularly those concluded between or with the Commu-
nist bloc countries, envisage the settlement of disputes only on a
bilateral basis through diplomatic channels or otherwise, without
providing for any other machinery. On the basis of information
available, it would appear that while there is still a definite prefer-
108 Handbook, supra note 22, at 76. The main basis for the ICAO role in the
settlement of disputes which concern bilateral air agreements seems to be Reso-
lution A1-23 of the First ICAO Assembly held in 1947, ICAO Doc. 7670, at
20-21 (1964). This resolution authorized the ICAO Council to act as an arbitral
body on any differences arising among Contracting States relating to international
civil aviation matters. The Council can render an advisory report, or a decision
binding upon the parties, "if the parties expressly decide to obligate themselves
in advance to accept the decision of the Council as binding." In all fairness, it
must be added that the ICAO Council has never been too anxious to exercise
such functions with respect to bilateral air agreements and might indeed have
some valid reasons for this reluctance.
"'See Cheng supra note 1, at 460-61; T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, at 174-79 (1969).
1o1T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 109, at 178.
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ence in these countries to settle possible disputes by bilateral nego-
tiations only, the denunciation of the agreement being the ultimate
means available to a party dissatisfied with the outcome of negotia-
tions, there are a number of notable exceptions and it would be
difficult to attempt to make a pronouncement on the historical
trend. In the doctrine of these States, intervention of third parties
in a bilateral dispute, or the settlement of such disputes by a third
party (through arbitration or otherwise), is found somewhat more
acceptable under circumstances when such a role assumed by a
third party would have the character of technical expertise on an
issue not involving any question of principle.111
In spite of the fact that most bilateral air agreements do provide
a procedure for the settlement of disputes, and in many of them
such a procedure could be characterized as "judicial" or "quasi-
judicial," this may not be always so. Should an absence of such a
provision in, say, only one or two bilateral agreements of a country
which otherwise consistently includes such a provision in its agree-
ments, indicate an exceptional "change of mind" of that particular
country as to the desired legal effect of the agreement? Or in the
case of a country which prefers to settle disputes through negotia-
tions only, not accepting a compulsory judicial or arbitration pro-
cedure, would that necessarily lead to the conclusion that such a
country denies the existence of any law in bilateral air agreements,
including such legal rules or principles as, for example, the exemp-
tion from customs for aircraft used on international air services,
for fuel and oils on board of such aircraft and other items, or, in
the commercial area, the principle of reciprocity and fair and equal
treatment of the designated airlines of the two parties?
After all, it cannot be disregarded that under Fawcett's formula
the presence or absence in a treaty of a provision concerning the
settlement of disputes through compulsory judicial process is only
one of the tests of the intention of parties to create legal obligations.
The other is whether the "parties have declared, or it can be de-
duced from the agreement as a whole, that it is to be governed by
one of the three bodies of law to which the parties are capable of
referring the agreements. 11' These three bodies are the rules of
"'This understanding is confirmed by F. I. Kozhevnikoff in his textbook on
International Law: KURS MEZHDUNARODNOVO PRAVA, at 532 (1966).
' Fawcett, supra note 58, at 400.
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public international law, the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations, and some specific system of municipal law.
As is evident from the preceeding, the analysis of present bi-
lateral air transport agreements cannot possibly provide a clear-cut,
black-and-white answer to all questions concerning their legal
nature. Particularly in cases where these agreements are analyzed
in their Bermuda form and with an emphasis on the Bermuda
capacity principles, the conclusion could be that "the parties to
bilateral air transport agreements are their own law" and that
"power can ... be viewed as the basis for the interpretation and
enforcement of bilateral air transport agreements.""..3 The absence
of a "substantial body of law" which could "clarify many of the
current uncertainties relating to the application of international
aviation agreements,. 1. or, from the other standpoint, the tradi-
tional reluctance of states to resort to an available objective mecha-
nism for the settlement of disputes, could be seen as another factor
that might lead to somewhat skeptical conclusions as to the legal
nature of bilateral air agreements. It is submitted, however, that
there are no reasons for carrying this basically negative attitude too
far to the possible detriment of the multifarious role of present air
bilaterals and their future generation.
As has been stated, air bilateral agreements have several un-
doubtedly legal facets such as an exchange of authorizations pur-
suant to Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, a bilaterally agreed
regulatory framework for the operation of services, resulting pri-
marily from the harmonization of national rules and policies, and
finally as a commercial transaction concerning the exchange of
routes and traffic rights. It is true that bilateral air agreements
comprise heterogenous elements, but they are simultaneously an
integrated whole, and a negative reflection on the value of some
of their components cannot but have some effect on the attitude
towards air bilaterals as such.1 '5 This does not mean to say that
3 Diamond, supra note 1, at 451, 452.
"I T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 109, at 179. In this particular context the
writer is commenting on the ICAO failure to establish adequate machinery for
the arbitration of bilateral disputes.
15 Cf. G. F. FitzGerald's observation that bilateral air matters are "of greater
importance to aviation economists and government policy makers than they are
to Main Street lawyers." INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW IN THE 1970's, CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 320 (1970).
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there is no room for improvement in the concept of bilateral air
transport agreements. In fact, more should be expected from them
in the future. After all, as Fawcett rightly stated, "international
community life can be carried on only if . . . agreements for the
solution of common administrative and technical problems are
adhered to and carried out."'' . Efforts toward possible strengthen-
ing of the legal nature of bilateral air agreements seem to be a
better prospect for the future-in spite of all appearances to the
contrary-than a resigned acceptance that the bargaining strength
and power is the main, or only determining factor in the economic
and also in the legal sense. The elementary requirement that treaties
in force, binding upon the parties, must be performed in good faith
could be reconciled only with some difficulty with the assumption
that a treaty might be applied one way or the other depending on
the power constellation which may vary at any given moment.
International law may be, to some extent, "ill adapted to the haz-
ards of commercial activity,"' 7 but the bilateral air agreements are
more than a commercial deal. On the other hand, there may be,
hypothetically speaking, vehicles other than a treaty for putting
international air services in operation, if a treaty form is "too legal"
for a simple self-regulatory, power-based, frequently changing re-
gime.
Strengthening the legal character of bilateral air agreements in-
volves a better understanding of and possibly a better approach
toward several of the problems discussed in the preceding parts of
this article, to wit: the creation of all necessary conditions for an
improved functioning of the "aeronautical authorities," a deeper
harmonization of air bilaterals and national regulations, a clearer
comprehension of the role of airlines, an improvement and less
ambiguity in the language used in air bilaterals, a greater consist-
ency in providing for impartial "settlement of disputes" procedures
and more frequent actual use of such mechanism.
It would undoubtedly be of a great benefit for international civil
aviation if the law of bilateral air transport agreements, or, in other
words, international administrative air law as embodied in bi-
lateral air transport agreements, would continue to be steadily de-
"' Fawcett, supra note 58, at 399.
n' O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw at 976 (2d ed. 1970).
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veloped, thus contributing to the establishment and maintenance of
an efficient and just economic order in this important area of inter-
national economic relations. As to the role of lawyers in this en-
deavour, it is "both to help resolve (client's) problems and also to
promote the role of law and the systematic development of collec-
tive behaviour," to borrow T. M. Franck's remarks pronounced
with respect to international law in Canadian practice.
